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ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK: EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENT IN RURAL INDIA* 
Introduction 
This paper describes in detail an experiment to measure pure attitudes 
towards risk. The experiment consisted of offering individuals a set of alter­
native payoffs which incorporate a tradeoff between expected return and standard 
deviation. The individual classifies himself into a risk aversion interval by 
his choice. 
A sequence of such games was played with a panel of 240 randomly selected 
household heads, in rural India, with 80 of their wives and dependent females and 
a few purposely selected individuals. During the sequence of the game the real 
payoffs were raised from trivial levels to expected returns which exceeded monthly 
incomes of unskilled laborers. The sequence of games incorporates tests of its 
reliability. 
The key result of the paper is that virtually all individuals are risk-averse 
when payoffs exceed trivial levels, but that extreme risk aversion is exceedingly 
rare as well. Most individuals have very similar levels of risk aversion. 
The paper then explores correlations between individual characteristics 
such as wealth, sex, and age with risk aversion. Wealth appears to have sur­
prisingly little effect on the extent of risk aversion. Schooling tends to reduce 
risk aversion, while prior luck in the sequence of games consistently reduces 
risk aversion. Other personal characteristics have less clear impact, and, 
in any event, given the similarity of risk attitudes, the quantitative impact 
of most variables on the extent of risk aversion is modest. 
*Hans P. Binswanger is an Associate of the Agricultural Development Council presently
stationed at the Economic Growth Center of Yale University. The experiment on which 
this paper is based was carried out while the author was stationed at the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, Hyderabad, India, and with its 
generous support. I would like to thank J. G. Ryan, M. von Oppen and Monique Bins­
wanger for valuable ideas during the methodology design stage, and B. C. Barah, 
R. D. Ghodake, S. S. Badhe, M. J. Bhende, V. Bhaskar Rao, T. Balaramaiah, N. B. 
Dudhane, Rekha Gaiki, K. G. Kshirgar, Madhu Nath, and Usha Rani who helped in 
carrying out the experiment. 
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In this paper the emphasis is on testing the robustness and reliability 
of the methodology, comparing its results with interview techniques and on 
the correlation of attitudes towards risk with personal characteristics. 
In a second paper (Binswanger 1978a) implications of the findings for 
psychological, economic and statistical theories of behavior under un-
1certainty are explored. 
THE EXPERIMENTAL SEQUENCE AND PRELIMINARY TESTS OF THE METHOD 
Prior to experimenting I had become aware of the work of Dillon 
and Scandizzo (1975) in Brazil in which they attempted to elicit risk atti­
tudes for a large sample of farmers by eliciting certainty equivalents of 
tmcertain prospects via interviews. Their method was adapted to the 
Indian conditions and tried there on 240 hous~hold heads. As discussed 
in the Appendix, it became clear that the interview results were neither 
reliable nor replicable; the answers reflected interviewer biases. 
After the risk attitude survey had failed, J. G. Ryan and M. von 
Oppen suggested experimental approaches with real payoffs. 2 Moral problems 
connected with gambling with poor people can be overcome by first handing 
out money to them as gifts and putting the maximum possible loss equal to 
the gifted amount. The experiment described below was designed on this 
basis. In designing it the following requirements had to be respected: 
The experiment should be simple so that illiterate farmers and landless 
1An earlier paper (Binswanger 1978b) reported some results of this 
study without describing the methodology in detail but focussing on 
implications of some of the findings for agricult1.1ral development. 
2 Experimental efforts to measure utility functions started with the 
work of Mosteller and Nogee (1951). Other methods have also been used by
Davjdson, Suppes and Siegel (1957), Edwards (1955), Becker, a.e Groot and 
· Marshak(1964). Some of the procedures are quite complicated. For a 
careful review of this line of work see Luce and Suppes (1965). 
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laborers could understand it without problem. It should allow each person 
long periods of time to think about his choices, and, if he so desires, he 
should be able to consult relatives or friends about them. Kost agricultural­
ly relevant decisions are made on an annual or crop-cycle basis with long 
stretches of reflection time in between, and mutual consultation is important. 
Furthermore, the payoff and costs should at least reach the range of small 
agricultural investments. 
Only minimal theoretical commitments were to be made at the outset. 
The set of choices should be ranked as 100re or less risky in a unique way 
almost regardless of the definition of risk one might want to adopt. Pure 
attitudes towards risk were to be Easured, i.e., they should not be con-
founded with any other set of preference such as those for leisure. Nor 
should the subjects be confronted with any budget constraints ruling out 
certain choices. One cannot, in measuring pure attitudes to risk, propose 
games to individuals for which the worst possible loss exceeds their current cash 
holdings. If one does, one may measure the impact of a cash- or budget-
constraint rather than the pure attitudes towards risk. 
1 Furthermore, 
differential ability to perform complicated calculations should not •influence 
the choices. Finally, dealing with simple coin tosses circumvents the problem 
of measuring subjective probabilities•.In short, the choices should 
reflect risk attitudes and not any set of constraints. 
¾iow apparently "risk-averse" behavior can be induced by budget constraints 
or by 1mpertect capital markets is discussed in detail by Robert T. Masson, 
1972. Samuelson (1977) has also shown that the failure to consider the effect 
of budget constraints or potential bankruptcy as an important determinant of 
choice under risk has been one of the main reasons for the confusion surrounding 
St. Petersburg Paradoxes. 
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An initial methodology was designed and pretested on 10 low-income 
individuals known to the author. The pretest results are not reported here 
since all the tests excep·t one have now been done on the much larger random 
sample and are reported below. With minor modification the experiment was 
then performed with the full samples. 
Table 1 explains the basic method. Individuals are given forms (which 
they can keep) with the numbers of panel A on Table 1. They have to choose 
between alternatives Oto F. Once they have chosen, a coin will be tossed 
and they get the left-hand amo'l.lllts if head comes up or the right-hand amc>1.mt 
1if tail comes up. Thus probabilities are known. An individual who chooses 
0 simply gets 50 Rs. i.e., participation in the game results in an automatic 
and sure increase in wealth by 50 Rs. An individual choosing C would receive 
30 Rs on head and 150 on tail. By not choosing zero he stands to lose 20 Rs, 
but could gain 100 Rs. Compared to B, which is 100re relevant, the potential 
losses and gains in going to Care 10 and 30 Rs respectively. Finally, by 
choosing F the individual would receive O or 200 Rs. F has the same expected 
return as E, but a higher variance, so only a risk-neutral or risk-p~eferrin~ 
individual would make the step from E to F. 
With each choice I have associated a name with the degree of risk 
aversion to simplify the discussion. Note that each of these names corresponds 
to an interval of partial risk aversion S which is fixed regardless of the 
level of payoff. Partial risk aversion was independently defined by Menezes 
1 rn the actual game sequence the winning and loosing side of the coins 
were changed for every new game level. 
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Table 1: The Payoffs and Corresponding Risk Classification 
Panel A Approximate 
Partial Risk t:.E 'E_/Head Tail Risk Aversion Aversion a/ ~•!:.SEChoice Low Payoff High Payoff Class Coefficient-
0 50 50 Extreme ... to 7.5 1 to 0.80 
A 45 95 Severe 7.50 to 1.74 0.8 to 0.66 
B 40 120 Intermediate 1.74 .823 0.66 to 0.50 
D* 35 125 Inefficient 
C 30 150 Moderate .823 to .316 0.50 to 0.33 
D 20 160 Inefficient 
E 10 190 Slight-to- .316 to 0 O. 33 to 0.00 
Neutral 
F 0 200 Neutral-to-
Negative 0 to - .., 0 to - .., 
aFor reasons which are explained in Binswanger (1978), a constant partial
risk aversion function on gains and losses was used to approximate S for the 
games. The function has the form U = (1-S)U(l-S). 
b i is the slope of the tradeoff between expected returns of and standard 
deviation of two games. 
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and Hanson (1970) and Zeckhauser and Keeler (1970). 1 It is defined on a 
utility function U in terms of certain wealth Was follows. Let Mbe the 
certainty equivalent of a new prospect and evaluate derivatives at 
W + M. Then 
S(W + M) • - MU" (w+M) /U' (w+M) (1)
where U' and U" are the first and second derivatives of the utility function. 
Other measures of the risk aversion are discussed in Binswanger (1978a), 
but S turned out to be the most convenient one. Another measure of 
risk aversion which is often useful is the Tradeoff ~ between expected 
return and standard deviation. 
In the experimental sequence (see Table 2) the individual is not 
presented immediately with the alternatives of Table 2, which is called the SO­
Rs game, but instead goes through a sequence of games and hypothetical 
questions at various game levels. All game levels are derived from the SO-
Rs-game by multiplying all amotm.ts by a constant. In the s-Rs-game all 
amounts are divided by 10, in the 0.50-Rs-game by 100 and they are urultiplied 
by 10 for the S00-Rs-game. The sequence starts with 5 games at the 0.50 
level to teach participants the rules of the game and to convince them 
To help 
people, the payoff structure was shown as a photograph with the sums of 
money to be received indicated by coins placed in each field. Since 
Indian coins vary substantially in shap~ even illiterate persons could clear­
ly visualize the payoff. The photographs were handed out to each player 
1 Zeckhauser and Keeler called it size-of-risk aversion. 
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Table 2: Sequence of Games and Hypothetical Questions 
Game Minimum delay Game Real or
Number since last event~/ Level Rs. Hypothetical Village~/ 
1 First Day 0.50 Real All 
2 One day 0.50 Real All 
3 One day 0.50 Real All
4 One day 0.50 Real All 
5 One day 0.50 Real All 
6 One day 50.00 Hypothetical Shirapur
excluded 
7 Same day 5.00 Real All 
Same day Hand out Rs. 5.00
for next day game All 
8 One day 50.00 Hypothetical Shirapur
excluded 
9 Same day 5.00 Real All
10 Same day 5.00 . Hypothetical All 
11 Two weeks 500.00 Hypothetical} Shirapur,
12 Same day 50.00 Real Kanzara, 
13 Same day 50.00 Hypothetical { Aurepalli only 




15 Same day 5.00 H~~otheticaJ lnokur only 
16 Two weeks 500.00 Hypothetical} Shirapur, 
Kanzara, 
17 Same day 50.00 Hypothetical { Aurepalli only 
aln many cases these minimum delays were exceeded by a few days. 
bThere are six villages, two each in three districts: Scholapur district:
Shirapur and Kalman; Ahola district: Kanjara and Kinkheda; Mahboobnagardistrict: Dokur and Aurepalli. Each village contains a panel of 40 house­holds and household heads were included in all villages. In Kinkheda and
Dokur the most important dependent female in each household was also includedin the experiment in addition to the head of household who, on occasion,
was female. 
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and left with them through the entire five to six weeks period of the 
experiment. 
The Study Sample and Methodological Tests 
The study was carried out in 240 rural households which constitute 
the Village-Level Studies of the International Coops Research Institute 
1for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Hyderabad, India. These studies 
are located in the semi-arid (seasonally dry) tropical tracts of Maharashtra 
and Andrah Pradesh, some of the poorer regions of India. In Jtme 1976 the 
average net wealth of these households was Rs 21716, i.e. roughly U.S. 
$2500 per household. The wealth is very tmevenly distributed 
and 47% of the households had less than Rs. lOOOOof wealth ($1162). Daily 
wage rates for unskilled laborers varied from Rs. 3 in the slack season to 
Rs. 6 in the peak season. The average payoff in the 50-Rs.-gamc is there­
fore commensurate with monthly wages. Playing the game with the full 
random sample was a shocking reminder of their poverty. 
1The village level studies of ICRISAT where started in May 1975 under 
the supervision of J. G. Ryan, N. S. Jedha and myself as a lon5term data 
gathering effort on a panel of 40 randomly selected households in each of 
the six purposely selected villages and include landless laborers as well as 
farmers, i.e. a cross-section of the entire rural population: Data are collected 
on~producer and consumer capital~ time allocation, agricultural production, 
nutrition and income and expenditure as well as some agrobiological observa­
tions. Each household is interviewed at 2 to 4 week intervals by resident 
investigators. For more details see Jodha et al. 1977, Binswanger and 
Jodha 1976, Binswanger et al. 1977. The studies are now in 
their fourth year and a considerable portion has 1,,een added to the data 
collection over the past two years. 
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Up to the 5 Rs level, the sequence was played with all 240 household heads 
of the sample (of which 20 were women) although temporary absences from 
villages made some of the sequences incomplete. In 3 of the six villages 
(118 households) the full sequence was played. In addition, in two villages 
the most' important dependent female of the household--usually the wife--was 
also included in the experiment up to the 5 Rs level (the dependent female 
sample). In 5 villages a nonrandom sample of the 3 most "progressive" 
1farmers of the village was added (the progressive farmer sample I). 
The resident male investigators played the 0.50 Rs game with the household 
heads and temporary female investigators played them with the dependent 
females. 
The resident male investigators played the 0.50-game. The 5-Rs­
games were played by B. C. Barah, Ghodake or myself with the help of the 
investigators. Assisted by the investigators, I played all SO-Rs-games 
to ensure uniformity of method and to protect the investigators from 
objections which might be raised by the villagers if they were disappointed 
by the outcome. In fact, the stoic way in which all respondents took 
losses was remarkable. To make sure that each respondent had sufficient 
time to make a choice, the choices were first ascertained by the investigators, 
who made pairwise comparisons among alternatives until the respondent 
stopped switching. The economist who played the game then verified the 
1Progressive farmers are early adopters of new techniques. They 
were identified by the resident investigators on the basis of their knowledge 
of the villages. 
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choice again by making pairwise comparisons with those alternatives adjoin­
ing the chosen one. 1 
In approximately 250 games which I played there were only 2 or 3 
instances in which the alternative selected with the interviewers differed 
from the one verified by me. Once made, choices were firmly adhered to 
despite the frequent assertions that the respondents could shift as much and 
as long as they wanted. 
Finally, a few impressionistic observations may be reported here: 
Respondents enjoyed the game and most of them spent much time waiting for 
their turns, sometimes discussing how much was gained or lost by others. 
No attempt was made to prevent or encourage this. In fact, this helped in 
establishing the strictness of the rules of the game and the certainty of 
the payments. It also prevented any attempt by respondents to argue about 
the outcomes of the coin tosses. Agricultural decisions and their outcomes 
are similar public knowledge, since everyone sees them in the field. 
The sequence contains a series of tests designed to evaluate accuracy 
and replicability of the method and to evaluate the accuracy of answers 
to hypothetical questions. A basic question about the method is whether 
behavior with given money would be different from the behavior when owned 
money was a risk. One would hypothesize tha~ if there were any differences, 
people would be more cautious with owned money than with given money. While 
pretesting the experimental sequence with 10 individuals known to me, I did 
ask them, at one stage, to play the 5Rs game with their own money. Nine out 
11f an adjoining alternative was inefficient, a pairwise comparison




Table 3: Preliminary Tests of the Method 
Slight Neutral 
Sair.ple and Game Inter­ to to Ineffi­ Sample 
Villages Number Extreme Severe mediate Moderate Neutral Negative cient Size 
Panel A: Playing with given m:,ney versus "own" money 
Ho,•sehold A Given money 
Heads No. 7, 5Rs .8 10.2 23.3 39.0 8.9 8.9 8.9 236 
All B 110WN 11 Money 
Vil lages No. 9, 5Rs .8 6.0 24.3 34.0 14.9 10.6 9.4 235 
Panel B: Comparison of Hypothetical versus Real games 
Hol!sehold C Hypothetical 
Heads No.6, 50Rs 10.4 11.7 16.9 25.9 10.4 10.4 14.3 77 
Kanzara D Hypothetical 
anc' No.8, 50Rs 10.4 2.6 14.3 38.9 15.6 6.5 11. 7 77 
Aurepalli 
E Real 
No.12, 50Rs 2.6 3.8 29.4 38.5 10.3 2.6 12.8 78 
F Hypothetical 
No.13, 50Rs 5.1 3.8 30.8 32.1 9.0 3.8 15.4 78 
G Hypothetical 
No,17, 50Rs 0 2.6 28.2 56.4 3.8 1.3 7.7 78 
Household H Hypothetical 
Heads No.11, 500 Rs 
(llefore 50 Keal) 1.7 12.7 39.9 27.1 7.6 3.4 7.6 us Shirapur, 
Kanzara and I Hypothetical 
Aurepalli No,16, 500 Rs 
(After 50 Real) 2.5 13.6 51. 7 28.8 0 0.9 2.5 118 
Panel C: Test of the Central Tendency Hypothesis 
D* D
Household J No.9, 5Rs 
Heads Including D 0 6.3 8.9 39.2 19.0 15.2 11.4 79 
Kanzara, K No.9, 5Rs 




Household L No.12, 50Rs Real 
Heac's Including D 2.6 2.6 30.8 43.6 10.2 0 10.2 39 
Kanzara, M No,12, 50Rs Real 
Kini heda Including D* 2.6 5.1 28.2 33.3 10.3 5.1 15.4 39 
Chi-Square Tests with 6 degrees of Freedom Distributions Distributions 
Co!!!eared Chi-Sguare ComEared Chi-Sguareand critical x2 0_05 • 12.59 A vs B 7.37 F vs G 14 .12 
C vs E 15.02 H vs I 15.91 
D VS E 10.16 J vs K 4.16 
F vs E 1.59 L vs M 3.31 
G vs E 8.48 
Note: All numbers in % of a sample size. 
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of the 10 chose the same alternative as when playing with given money, 
whereas the 10th shifted towards an alternative which was more risk-averse. 
In the large-scale experiment the test was performed differently. On the 
first 5-Rs-game (Number 7) no money was given out before the choice. But 
5 Rs were handed out for the second 5-Rs-game (Number 9) on the day preceding 
the game. 
On the day of game 9, individuals had to put that amount of money on 
the table which their gamble put at risk, if they wanted to play. (Since 
they had had it for a day it was their "own" money, so to speak.) No 
pressure whatsoever was applied to play at all. Non-attendance to the 
game on that day was interpreted as a choice of the riskless alternative 
zero. As can be seen from Table 3 Panel A, the choices on the two 5-Rs­
games did not differ statistically from each other for the household heads. 
(See Chi-Square value A vs B,) The results for the females is not shown but 
was similar. Among the males there was a very modest shift towards less 
risk aversion, which is contrary to the hypothesis that there is any 
difference in behavior when only gains are considered than when both gains 
and losses are considered. 1 
The second test concerns the usability of answers to hypothetical 
games. It was hoped that after playing the full sequence up to the 50 Rs 
level, individuals would acquire the introspective ability to tell how they 
would play at the 500 Rs level. One could then use the hypothetical answers 
1This finding is further supported by the rationalizations of their 
choices which individuals were asked to give after the real 50-Rs-game 
Number 12. Only about 1/4 of the respondents with considerable verbal skills 
were able to given any explanation at all. But these verbalizations were 
invariably cast in terms such as the following: "If I choose B rather than 
A, I lose 5 Rs on head but gain 25 Rs on tail; but if I further shift to C, 
I lose 10 Rs for a gain of only 30 Rs. Therefore I prefer B." The long 
sequence of games seemed to teach people to regard the certain amounts as their 
own, or, alternatively, not to make a difference between "real" gains and 
losses and opportunity gains and losses. 
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as if they were real choices. Hypothetical games 6, 8 and 15 at the 50 
Rs level were introduced to be compared in 2 villages (Aurepalli and Dokur) 
with the real 50--Rs-game. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. 
They show that, before playing the 50-Rs-game, (distributions C and U) 
people believe that they will either act more aversely or less aversely to 
risk than they actually do in the real game E. The difference between the 
outcomes in games 6 and 12 is statistically significant. In the second 
hypothetical game (Nuni>er 8), the predicting ability has improved, probably 
because one game at the 5 Rs level taught people better about their prefer­
ences. However, once the 50-Rs-game is played, answers to hypothetical 
questions are similar to the real game. There is no statistically signi­
ficant difference between the real choices in game 12 and the hypothetical 
answers to games 13 or 17, although in game 17 there is a trend towards 
further concentration into the two central categories. This indicates that 
predictive power is pretty good after exposure to a game at high stakes. 
Note also the substantial difference in the answers to the hypothetical 
500~s ~ame before the real 50- Rs-game (Number 11) and after the real 50 
Rs~ame (Number 16). The same trends towards concentration observed at the 
50-Rs-game level are repeated. This may be taken as an indication that, 
at the end of the experimental sequence, people are fairly well able to 
predict how t~ey would act at payoff levels substantially different from 
the ones actually played. I will thus treat the answer to game number 16 
on par with the real answers, but disregard all hypothetical answers given 
before the real 50 ~-game. 1 
1Another reason for accepting the Rs 500 answers is the fact that,despite frequent denials, many respondents continue to hope strongly that the500-Rs-game will be played in the future and the investigators are frequentlyasked when that will happen. The prospect is no longer unreal to them. 
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The third test is to investigate whether individuals, when confronted 
with a game such as in Table 1, have an automatic tendency towards al­
ternatives in the center of the distribution. Table 2 contains two risk­
inefficient alternatives D and D*, which are derived from C and F respectively 
and have the same means but higher variance. No risk-averse individual 
should choose these alternatives and they were introduced precisely to test 
whether people could detect stochastic dominance in this simple context. 
Note that in a game structure containing D but not D*, alternative C 
is the most central alternative, and under the "central tendency hypothesis," 
should be the most preferred one. On the other hand, if Dis deleted from 
Table 1, alternative D* becomes the most central one. In three villages 
(Kanjara, Kinkheda and Aurepalli) half the respondents were given the game 
structure containing the alternative D while the other half were given the 
game structure containing D*. Panel C of Table 3 shows that,·at the 5 Rs 
level (distribution J and K),the frequency of choosing D* is lower than 
of choosing D, thus contradicting the central tendency hypothesis. At the 
50 Rs level (distribution Land M) the frequency of D* is higher than for 
D. But at both game levels the frequency distributions associated with the 
two game structures can not be distinguished statistically. 
Prior to the experiment with real payoffs we had made an attempt to 
measure attitudes towards risk via the Dillon-Scandizzo interview procedure 
but gradually discovered that that procedure was unreliable and non-replicable. 
Our suspicion of the reliability of the Dillon-Scandizzo interview method 
was initially aroused by the fact that, within the same region (Scholapur 
district), Investigator A was recording substantially lower levels of risk 
aversion than Investigator Bin the interviews. We therefore reinterviewed 
the villagers with the same method but by switching investigators across the 
villages. From this it became clear that the risk aversion measure of the 
15 
interviews reflected interviewer biases more than anything else. (see the 
Appendix for a detailed discussion) 
To test whether the experimental method with real payoffs is also 
subject to investigator biases, the sample in each village of the Scholapur 
area was split in half and each half assigned for the full experimental 
sequence to one of the two investigators. No statistically significant 
differences could be detected between the risk aversion distributions of the 
two halves of the sample. Thus no evidence of investigator bias could be 
uncovered for the experimental method. 
THE MAIN EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The Risk Aversion distributions corresponding to different game levels 
are given in Table 4, first for those villages where the game was played up 
to the 50 Rs level (with a hypothetical answer at the 500 Rs level) and 
then for all the households, including those where the eame was played only 
up to the 5 Rs level. 
It is clear from the table that the risk aversion distri-
bution shifts very markedly to the left as game levels rise. As can be 
seen from Table~ this implies increasing partial risk aversion or increasing 
risk aversion as measured by the tradeoff ~ between expected return and standard 
deviation. 1 
Consider the Slight-to-Neutral and Neutral-to-Preferred classes: 
At the 0.50 level the percentage in each of these classes is around 15 to 
20% and it falls monotonically to near zero as the payoff level rises to 
500 Rs. In the moderate risk aversion class we initially find around 25% 
of the individuals. This fraction first rises at the 5Rs and 50 Rs levels 
1In Binswanger (1978a) it is shown that absolute risk aversion is 
decreasing while relative risk aversion is first decreasing and then 
increasing. 
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because people enter this class when leaving the lower risk aversion classes. 
But between the 50 and 500 Rs level the number of entrants from lower risk 
aversion is lower than the number of individuals who become more risk averse 
and the frequency in this class declines. The intermediate risk aversion 
class starts out with 28.5 of individuals in game 2 at the 0.50 RS level. 
As that game is repeated people prefer to play at higher stakes. But as 
the payoff level rises again, more people enter this class from the 
lower risk aversion classes and at the 500 Rs level more than 50% of individuals 
are concentrated in this single class, to which a partial risk aversion co­
efficient corresponds of 0.823 to 1.74. The 500 Rs game corresponds to 
payoffs in the order of substantial fertilizer investments for these house­
holds, and many are too poor to undertake them. For some households it even 
exceeds net wealth. 
The extreme and severe risk aversion classes together contain less 
than 10% of the individuals for all levels except the 500 Rs level where 
this rises to 15%. There appears to be an upper barrier on risk aversion 
which is exceeded only very slowly at high stakes. 
As is shown in more detail in appendix Table A-2, individuals' ,refer­
ences for a given alternative are not very stable. For example in the 
two .SW.Rs-games (No. 7 and 9) only 40% of individuals chose the same alter-
native both times. Most of the shifts, however, are into or from neighboring 
efficient and inefficient alternatives 
In any given game, arotmd 10% of individuals choose one of the in­
efficient alternatives. This is clearly lower than the percentage of 
individuals who would choose it on a random basis. Consider game 12. 
Inefficient alternatives exist between the intermediate and moderate and the 
moderate and slight-to-neutral alternative. These three clas$eS and 
Table 4. The Effect of Payoff Size on Distribution of Risk Aversion 
Payoff Level 














No. 2 1.7 
Household Heads: 
5.9 28.5 
ShiraEur 2 Kanzara 1 
20.2 
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All Household Heads 
F 0.50 
Games 2 + 3 1.7 7.6 18.5 22.7 17.1 18. 7 13.7 475 
G o.so 
Games 4 + 5 0.9 8.2 12.9 27.5 22.8 18.4 8.3 473 
H 5.00 
Games 7 + 9 0.8 8.1 23.8 36.5 11.9 9.8 9.1 471 















































the inefficient one contain 78.57. of individuals. If 
people would fall 
into the two inefficient and three efficient classes a
t random, the two 
inefficient classes should contain at the very least 1
/5 of the 78.5% 
observations, i.e. 15.7%, but the actual percentage is
 9.3%, i.e. a little 
more than half. 
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Who chooses inefficiently varies much across games. 
Of those 94 or 33%
individuals played all the games from No. 1 to No. 9. 
chose one of the inefficient alternatives at least onc
e, i.e. did not 
recognize that they were stochastically dominated, or 
did not care about it 
at least once. 
The evidence can thus be summarized as follows. For i
ndividuals who 
initially have low risk aversion it tends to rise fair
ly rapidly as game 
levels start to rise beyond trivial levels. For indiv
iduals who initially 
have intermediate to moderate levels of risk aversion,
 it declines slowly 
or remains fairly constant as game levels rise. 
Very few individuals have partial risk aversion coeffi
cients much 
above 1.74 and even at fairly high stakes that level i
s exceeded for less 
As can be seen from the Chi-Square tests, thesethan 15% of individuals. 
trends are statistically significant and evident in bo
th the reduced sample 
as well as the full sample of households. 
Interpreted in a utility theory framework, the utility
 fi.mction for 
money income is nonlinear and risk-averse in money inc
ome for all but one 
1
out of 118 individuals. At game levels of 50 Rs. 
1The one person who--at the 50 Rs level-chose the most ris
ky alternative 
and indicated willingness to play the same at the 500 
Rs level was a tuberculosis 
patient whom most people expected to die and to whose 
house we went to play. 
The other individual who played a most risky 50 Rs gam
e was a boy of 16 years 
and he did not want to play that game at the 500 Rs le
vel anymore. 
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and above, three-fourths or more of all individuals fall into only two 
risk aversion classes, the intermediate and moderate one. This concentration 
of risk attitudes within a fairly narrow interval is quite remarkable, and 
- implies that in explaining economic behavior of these rural households, risk 
aversion will be important for virtually all of them. On the other hand it 
will be difficult to explain differences in behavior among them on account 
of differences in pure attitudes towards risk. 
These results contrast sharply with the results of Dillon and Scandizzo 
(1977), which are discussed in the Appendix. They also conflict sharply 
with the distribution of risk attitudes found for the same sample with 
the same interview technique than Dillon and s-candizzo used. 
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Correlation of Risk Aversion with Personal Characteristics 
Empirically, virtually nothing is known about how personal 
-characteristics of individuals are correlated with risk aversion. 
The data set collected in India is well suited to explore this issue 
with multiple regression analysis of personal characteristics on the 
extent of risk aversion at different game levels. We should note at 
the outset, however, that individual characteristics, at least at high 
game levels, cannot be expected to have a massive impact on risk aversion 
simply because most people have similar attitudes. 
Ideally, we would like to know the causal relationships from 
personal characteristics,such as wealth, schooling, etc., to risk aver­
sion, and the reverse causality from risk aversion to earnings ability 
and schooling choices. This however, poses formidable simultaneous 
equation problems which eventually have to be solved by simultaneous 
equation techniques. As it stands, the data set does not yet contain 
sufficient truly exogenous variables which can be used as instruments 
to identify a full simultaneous equation model. However, data gathering 
to nn ~hi~ h~~ hPPn inir;~r~n uithin the ICRISAT village-level-studies. 
In the meantime, multiple regression techniques can, for most variables, 
only indicate correlations corrected for the other individual variables. 
A second problem is the choice of the dependent variable and its 
functional form. Should we use partial risk aversion S l ,or Z, or should 
we simply assign integers to the alternatives Oto F going from Oto 5 and 
1Partial risk aversion is a multiplicative transformation of absolute 
risk aversion at each game level and regressing on partial risk aversion 
amounts to the same thing as a regression on absolute risk aversion. 
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use them as indicators of risk aversion? And should these measures be 
used directly or be transformed into logarithms or other forms? For 
correlation analysis one would like to choose that variable and variable 
transformation which is best able to capture the correlations, as long 
as the choice of different forms doe·s not lead to contradictory results. 
Therefore, a series of experimental regressions was performed with the 
following forms and variables: Alternative Number; Z; ln Z; logistic 
of Z; S ln s; l, k = 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.5, 0.66; logistic on S. These 
transformations had little impact on sign patterns of the coefficients 
but Zand ln s performed best in terms of -2R and gave very similar results. 
Therefore, the regressions on Ins are reported. 
Second, for Sand Z, the choices of an alternative only indicate 
a range of the risk aversion coefficient S or the variable Z. The 
arithmetic mean of the endpoints of the intervals was assigned to each 
choice as an estimate of Z. For S, the geometric mean of the endpoints 
was assigned as the measure of s. The geometric mean was chosen because 
the interval length for each choice increases markedly as we move to 
1more risk-averse alternatives. Problerr~ also arise in assigning a 
value for Zand s to alternatives F and 0. In the case of F, a value of 
zero was given to Sand Z, although it could be negative. Given the 
result that practically no one prefers risk at high game levels, a value 
of zero is not unreasonable. 2 For alternative 0, the upper bound for 
S is equal to infinity, while its lower bound is 7 .50. Since the experi­
mental results indicate that very few individuals chose alternative zero,_ 
1For alternative Eat one of the endpoints Sc O and the geometr~cmean of both endpoints would be zero. Therefore, the arithmetic meanwas chosen in this case. 
2 .
For logarithmic transformations, a value of zero is inadmissable.It was therefore - rather arbitrarily - set at 0.007. 
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it is reasonable to assume that their partial risk aversion should not 
exceed 7.5 by very much and this value was increased by 12% to give a 
value of 8.4. For Z the assignment was less arbitrary. One can show 
that--for games with equal probabilities--Z cannot exceed 1.
1 
Since the 
lowe·r bound is O. 8, the mean value of O. 9 was assigned to choice zero. 
Note that at higher game levels very few individuals choose alternatives 
O or F so that the--admittedly arbitrary--choices just described should 
have little impact on the regression results. 
Third, it is not clear how to treat the choices of inefficient 
alternatives. It would, of course,be best to simply leave out all indi­
viduals who chose an inefficient alternative at least once in the 
sequence. However, that leads to a loss of about one-third of the sample, 
which is especially harmful at the high game levels, where only 118 
individuals played. An alternative would be to leave out, in each regress­
ion, those individuals who chose an inefficient alternative in that game. 
But then each regression would be over a different data set with unknown 
impact. Finally, one can assume that individuals who choose D* or D 
have essentially the same attitudes as those who choose Band C 
the alternatives have the same expected return and only slightly higher 
standard deviation. To test whether such a treatment has any effect on 
1Consider two alternatives with a bad and a good outcome of equal
probability:
Alternative Bad luck Good luck E SE
0 5 5 5 0
1 5 7 6 1
6EFor these alternatives Z = ASE s 1, but all risk averters who prefer 
more to less will choose alternative one, hence the largest Z is 1. 
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the results, such regressions were run and compared to regressions where 
all individuals who choose inefficiently at least once in the games No. 1 
to No. 9 were left out. These regressions differed little from each 
other and coefficient signs were the same except for coefficients with 
extremely low t-values. But the added observations resulted in lower 
standard errors of coefficients and the results reported thus include 
the inefficient choices as Band C choices respectively. 
Fourth, different subsets of the data might lead to different 
regression results and - for tmknown reasons - should not be combined. 
Therefore, several regressions were performed on different data subsets 
to test whether this is indeed a problem. The subsets were as follows: 
The full sample, the household heads of those villages where the full 
sequenc~ of games was played (Aurepalli, Shirapur, Kanzara),the house­
hold heads of the other three villages (Dokur, Kalman, Kinkheda) and 
finally the dependent females of Dokur and Kinkheda. 
F tests indicated that for regressions on Zand log S, the data 
sets could be combined easily for all games·2, 5, 7 and 9. 1 But because 
the data for dependent females is not independent of that of the household 
heads, the final regressions reported include only household heads of 
all six villages. 
Lastly, there are issues of the functional form of the independent 
variables. Including both linear and square terms of all continuous inde­
pendent variables resulted in only nonsignificant square terms and 
1
The largest F value for combining the data sets was 1.376 againsta critical value at the 10% level of approximately 1.45. All other Fvalues were substantially lower. 
24 
was abandoned. Age and wealth (the only variables which had no zero 
observations) were also included in logarithmic form. But the resulting 
coefficient led to the same qualitative results as when they were included 
linearily. 
Running so many experimental regressions is justified in an 
exploratory study in an area where so little is known. It helps to 
distinguish robust results from spurious ones which can only be demon­
strated for particular functional forms or data subsets. The results 
of these experiments are summarized in Table 5 which shows the sign 
patterns and patterns of significance of different coefficients for 
18 experimental regressions: 8 experiments on functional forms of 
dependent variables, 2 experiments on including or excluding inefficient 
choices, 5 experiments to look at different subparts of the data, and 
2 experiments on ftmctional forms of dependent variables. Each of the 
18 specifications was used for games No. 2, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 16. Game 
No. 2 was used rather than game one because in game one the rules of 
the game might not have been fully clear to all individuals. 
In Table 5, one plus or minus sign indicates that the coefficient 
was of the respective sign in more than 3/4 of the experimental regress­
ions. Two plus or minus signs indicate that the sign was the same in 
all experiments. A question mark means that the sign pattern was not 
consistent. One star means that the coefficient was statistically signi­
ficant at the 10% level in at least one of the experimental regressions. 
Two stars means that the coefficient was statistically significant in 
at least 2/3 of the cases when it had the indicated sign. Three stars 
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Table 5 Robustness of Signs of Variables in Different Regression Experiments 
Game Level 0.50 Rs
Game Number No. 2 No. 5 
5 Rs 50 Rs. 500 Rs
No. 7 No. 9 No. 12 No. 16 
Women ? -* + * ? +*b ? 
Progressive ? -* ~ --* ? -*
Working Age
Adults per family ? + + * ++ ++ 
Salary + * ** ? *
Land Rented ? ** ? ? ? 
Gamblers + - * ? + 
Age + * + * + + *
Schooling ? ?* -* * - **




* * * ? 
Luck * * * * *** * 
Symbols used: +(or-) The coefficient is positive (or negative) in 3/4th or more of
all cases. 
++(or--) The coefficient is positive (or negative) in all cases 
? Sign uncertain 
* The coefficient is sl.gnificant in at least one case (10%) level.
** The coefficient in statistically significant in at least 2/3
of the cases when it has the sign indicated (10% level).
*** The coefficient is statistically significant in all cases (10%
level).
a
Total of 18 experiment~ lobrking adults, salary, land rented, and gamblers were includedin only some of the experiments.
b .The contradictions of sign arise in different data subset. 
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mean that it was always statistically significant. 
Overall, the experiments indicate that within any given game the 
sign patterns are fairly robust. Only in one case (regression No. 9) was 
the dummy for females statistically significant with opposite sign in dif­
ferent subsets of the data (but not across variable specifications). However, 
across games the sign patterns are much less consistent. In what follows, 
the results are discussed variable by variable. 
In Table 6 the coefficients of the variables with ln Sare given. 
The following discussion refers to both Table 5 and 6 to judge the coeffi­
cients and their stability. To judge the magnitu~e of the effects implied, 
Table 7 computes a predicted S for the 5 and 50 Rs levels and compares it 
with the geometric average Sin the sample (first line, underlined values). 
The predicted Sis computed as follows: Add to the average S the shift 
implied in the regression coefficient and a move from the average value of 
1
the independent variable to the largest value observed in the sample. 
This means that we compute the effect of the largest possible shift away 
from the mean of each independent variable. The table also shows which 
choice would be implied by the new value ofS. 
Thirteen variables were included in the regression, apart from the 
village dummies, which were included to take account of effects on risk 
aversion of such variables as agroclimatic differences, etc. 
Assets: Economists usually assume that rich people should be more 
willing to engage in favorable games of a fixed size than poor people, 
i.e. for any given game level, partial risk aversion Sor Z 
1 1 -
Predicted S • exp {~r1log Si}+ exp
 {bj (Xjmax - Xj)} where n is 
the sample size and Xj the j'th independent variable and Xj is the arith­
metic mean, and bj is its estimated coefficient. 
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Table 6: Regression of Personal Characteri ■ tics on Partial Risk Aversion 
0.5 llupees 5 Rupees 50 llupees 500 Rs 
Dependentb 
Variable No. 2 No. 5 No. 7 No. 9 No. 12 No. 16 
Intercept -2.317 -2.331 -1.030 -1.825 .174 .426 
Village 1 .782 
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Net transfers -.139 -.340 -.265 -.141 -.0463 .00482 
received (in (. 77) (1.90)* (1.94)* ( .99) ( .44) ( .17) 
1000 Rs) 
Luck -.212 -.209 -.126 -.107 -.115 -.0425 
(1.69)* (3.20)* (2.69)* (2.37)* (2.72)* (1.67)* 
.100 .171 .192 .212 .055 .088 
F 2.644 3.928 4.370 4.818 1.491 1.816 
N•, obs. 228 228 228 228 111 111 
8 
The values in parenthesis are t-value. * indicates that a variable is statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level. 
:to.1, 1.645; to.1, 120 • 1.658; Fo.1, 14, i.soCD •CD • 
b
In terms of partial risk aversion coefficients S, the dependent variable was in <:J/7) 
for all bets. In terms of A the dependent variable is the following functions of A; 
0. SO-Rs-games Y • 1n (A/10); SO-Rs-game Y • ln (A x 10); 500-Rs-level; Y • ln "(A x 100). 
The-interce~t term has been converted to reflect the intercept of s. 
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Table 7: The Largest Possible Shifts in Choices Implied in the Regression Results 
Maximum Predicted Choice Predicted Choice 
Explanatory Minus Mean s Implied Sat Implied 
Variable Yaluen at 5 Rs Level 50 P.s Level 
SbAverage .483 C .705 C {-+B2 C 
Women 1 .540 C • 724 C (-+B) 
Progressive 1 .223 E • 604 C 
C .750 C (-+ti)Working Adults 0.5 .515 
(share age 15-59) 
Salary Rs 5.069 .oso- E • 345 C (-+E) 
(Rs 1000) 
Age 38 Years .637 C .418 C 
Schooling 12 Years .198 E .420 C 
d 
Assets 185. 277 .243 E 
(Rs 1000) 
Transfer income 6.224 .093 E .528 C 
(Rs 1000) 
5 .257 E • 396 CLuck 
aFor dummy variables the value taken was one. 
bAntilog of average of ln S 
c Y(+ X) This notation means that the value of S implies choice of alternative 
Y, but that it is close to the indifference point with X. 
dCoefficient has wrong sign. 
(the tradeoff between expected return and standard deviation) should 
decrease as wealth rises. In the ·regressions, wealth is measured by 
1gross sales value of physical assets. In these households, on average 
69% of physical wealth is held in the form of land. In the semi-arid 
tropical environment, land gives rise to highly variable income 6trearns. 
The weakness of the relationship between physical assets and risk 
aversion is very surprising, given the fairly strong effect of the game 
size. Within a given game and across games, the sign of the coefficient 
is not consistently negative, although negative signs predominate and 
only negative signs are ever statistically significant. The largest 
statistically significant coefficient of -.0116 in game 9 implies 
that a shift from average wealth to the .largest wealth observed in the 
sample is not entirely sufficient to bring an individual from choice C 
to risk neutrality. It would not be sufficient to move an individual 
who initially was indifferent between A and B to choose alternative E. 
For the crucial 50-Rs-game, the coeff'icient is usually of the 
wrong sign (positive, close to zero and not significant). Contrary to 
all expectations, wealth has little impact on individuals' behavior at 
game levels which are connnensurate with monthly wage rates. 
Schooling: Another form of wealth is human wealth and schooling 
is a proxy variable for it. Average schooling in the sample is 2 years, 
but the maximum is 16 years, i.e., the distribution is highly skewed. 
At low game levels this variable has little influence on risk aversion, 
but at the 5 Rs level and above, it generally reduces the level of risk 
1It would have been better to use net worth rather than gross wealth. 
However, the data on borrowings and lendings is fairly poor, but imply
that at higher wealth levels borrowings were a small fraction of gross
wealth. 
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aversion and is often statistically significant, although not generally 
so in the regressions using log S. But again, the impact of schooling 
is not massive. In the five-Rs-game, the coefficient size of -8.0432 
is sufficient to shift an individual who goes from 2 years to 14 years 
of schooling from the intermediate risk aversion class to the slight­
to-neutral class. At the 50 Rs level, the same shift is not sufficient 
to shift the individual's risk aversion by an entire class interval. 
The interpretation of schooling as a proxy for human wealth 
is only one interpretation. It is also possible to view the effect as one 
which affects the utility function itself. Better schooled people could 
be better able to take risks because (a) they have better information pro­
cessing capacity or (b) because they have. better alternative income 
opportunities if one risky venture, which they engage in, fails, i.e., they 
are better insured. The data do not allow us to distinguish these hypotheses. 
Two variables which are correlated with schooling are the amount 
of income received in the form of salary (i.e., from a secure job) and 
a dummy variable for progressive farmers. Salary employment, with some excep­
tions, is restricted to individuals with schooling, and totally illiterate 
individuals have cf the household head sample have 
zero schooling). Thus, schooling could partly determine the access to 
jobs. Progressive farmers are those whom the resident investigators 
designated as the early adopters of new techniques (5 in each village7. 
Schooling is again correlated with this variable and can be expected to 
contribute to it. It is interesting to note that if these two variables 
are suppressed, schooling does become statistically significant, 
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even in the regressions using ln Sas the dependent variable for 
risk behavior. It will therefore be worthwhile to build and test 
a model capable of distinguishing whether schooling decreases risk 
aversion causally or the least risk-averse individuals are mote likely 
to acquire more education. 
Salary employment by itself tends to decrease risk aversion, 
the sign being negative fairly consistently, although it is not statisti­
cally significant at the SO Rs level. Similarly, the progressive farmer 
dummy has a fairly consistent negative sign, but at the high game levels 
its coefficient is so small that it is not significant. 
Luck or past experience: Econcmists would not usually expect that 
past experience with a random process,which is as transparent as flipping 
a coin, would have a strong impact on a person's next choice over alternatives 
defined on it. This is a hypothesis which psychologists would be more 
fond of, and such a view is strongly supported by the experiment. Past 
experience or luck is defined as r Xi, where i is the game number 1, 2, 
i 
3, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 12, and X takes a value of 1 when the person wins, -1 
when he loses and O when he neither wins nor loses (alternative zero). 1 
The coefficient is consistently negative and almost always statistically 
significant. Note also that its size tends to decline as the game level 
rises, i.e., its impact is weaker the higher the stakes. Nevertheless, at 
the 5 Rs level (after 7 games), a person who had consistently won (luck= 
+7) would tend to shift from playing alternative C to playing alternative 
1
For each game, the luck variable is only defined over the preceding 
game, i.e., a new luck variable is defined at each successive game. 
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E compared to a person who had had an equal number of &ainS and losses. 
Finally, past experience does not wear off rapidly. The answers to the 
500 Rs game were collected 2 or more weeks after the last game was 
1
actually played. 
That past experience should have such an impact on risk aversion 
implies that, after a series of drought~ farmers would be more reluctant 
to invest (even if they had the same wealth levels as before the drought) 
than they normally would and should on acco\lllt of their own average risk 
aversion. 
Age: Age has a fairly consistent positive sign in games up to 
the 5 Rs level but a consistently negative sign at the 50 and 500 Rs 
level. At the 50 Rs level it is sometimes statistically significant but 
not at the 500 Rs level. Is it possible that yo\lllg people are more 
willing to engage in risky games at low stakes whereas older people, 
having dealt much more in risky economic games at high stakes, might 
be more willing to take risks at the high levels? But at the 50 Rs level 
the quantitative impact of even 38 years of age difference are not 
sufficient to shift an individu~l 's choice by an entire class interval. 
Sex: The women dummy variable exhibits very inconsistent coefficient 
signs, being as often positive as negative. At high game levels it 
1Psychologists working experimentally in the area have found that 
individuals exhibit preferences for heads or tails in coin tosses, 
Since the winning sign of the coin was changed for each game level, such 
preference cannot account for the observations on the luck variable. But 
it is possible that the preferences for one side of the coin seen in 
earlier experimental work might be caused by whether a person had a win­
ning or losing streak on one side of the coin. 
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does not appear to affect behavior at all. Clearly, there is little 
support for the hypothesis that women are less willing to take risks 
than men, once adjustment is made for variables such as schooling. 
In tabular analysis it was noted that--on the average-women are slightly more 
risk-averse than men (means not significantly different). At best, one 
can explain this by the fact that, in the environment studied, women do 
not have equal access to education as men. Not a single woman in the 
sample ever attended school. 
Working age adults: This variable approximates the proportion of 
productive individuals in a household: it varies on the unit interval, 
i.e. it is the weighted number of adults between the ages of 15 and 59 
1 years divided by the weighted sum of family members. The lower this ratio, 
the higher the proportion of individuals whom the working age adults have to 
support. One would thus expect the variable to have a negative siV1 by 
saying that those with few dependents can afford to take more risk. This 
hypothesis is not supported by the data. The coefficient shifts in sign 
and is hardly ever significant. At higher game levels it is consistently 
positive, i.e., of the wrong sign. 
Land rented: A portion of the new literature on tenancy assumes 
that share tenancy is used to spre3d the riskiness of farming (Bardhan 
and Srinivasan 1971 ) . The reasoning is not based on differential 
risk aversion between landlords and tenants, but it would be considerably 
strengthened if tenants were generally more risk-averse than landlords. 
The ''Land Rented" variable measures the net area leased in by a house­
hold. It is negative for landlords and positive for tenants. At low 
game levels there is some indication that tenants are less risk-averse 
1In computing the ratio, adult males (above 15 years of age) were 
given a weight of 1, adult females a weight of 0.8 and children of 0.5. 
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than landlords, not vice-versa. At high game levels, there appears to 
be no difference. 
Net transfers received measures the net amount of income transfer 
received from relatives and other sources between July 1, 1975 and 
June 30, 1976. (It is negative for those who send transfers.) It has a 
fairly consistent negative sign which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the possibility to rely on income transfers reduces risk aversion 
because it insures against adversity. It is not a good measure of 
"insurance" via transfer mechanisms, because it measures what has 
actually been received rather than what can potentially be received, 
but the best which can be done at this stage. 
Gamblers: The individuals who liked to gamble (by buying lottery 
,tickets or playing cards, with and without money) were identified. Less 
than five percent of individuals were so identified and the variable 
leads to contradictory results. 
To briefly summarize the conclusions: Past luck with a random 
process makes people distinctly less risk-averse when again confronted 
with it. Physical assets tend to reduce risk aversion but neither 
strongly nor very consistently. Schooling tends to reduce risk aversion 
fairly consistently. Salary employment and income transfers from others 
both tend to reduce risk aversion slightly, possibly indicating an 
insurance effect of more reliable income sources than agriculture. 
Progressive farmers tend to be slightly less risk-averse than average 
farmers, but the effect is weak at high game levels and can probably not 
account for their higher willingness to accept new techniques. The 
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following variables have contradicting signs and seem not to be strongly 
correlated with risk aversion: Sex, working age adults (dependency ratio), 
amount of land rented, and age. Again, emphasis has to be placed on the 
weakness of all these correlations. Massive changes in the "independent" 




Interviews vs. Experiments to Elicit Attitude Towards Risk 
This appendix discusses the reliability of interview based methods 
to elicit attitudes towards risk and compares the results of interviews 
with those derived from the game with real payoffs. The interview based 
method was taken from Dillon and Scandizzo (1977) and slightly adapted to fit 
the conditions in the study area. Dillon and Scandizzo describe their 
method as follows: "The farmer's risk attitudes were appraised via their 
choices between hypothetical but realistic farm alternatives involving risky 
versus sure outcomes. These questions form the basis of our empirical analy­
sis and were geared to finding the certainty equivalents of risky prospects 
involving stated probabilities. Two types of risky prospects were used 
yielding two subsets of responses for each group of farmers. The first 
type involved only payoffs above household subsistence requirements. In 
these, while the level of total income was at risk, subsistence was assured. 
The second type of risky prospect included the possibility of not producing 
enough to meet subsistence requirements. Both types-of risky prospect in­
volved only two possible outcomes whose probabilities were provided as 
frequencies and were maintained constant at 0.75 ("3 years out of 4") for 
the 'good' outcome and 0.25 ("1 year out of 4") for the 'bad' outcome." 
The 'good' outcome and the 'bad' outcome of the uncertain prospect 
are fixed so that the expected value of the uncertain prospect was one­
half of subsistence income and twice the subsistence income respectively. 
(Subsistence income had previously been established for each household 
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individually by asking them - item by item - their minimum annual require­
ment of all food and clothing which they considered necessary. Subsistence 
income ranged from Rs 462 to Rs 14117). The certainty equivalent of the 
prospect was then found by varying the certain income until indifference 
with the uncertain prospect was attained. 
The questions were made meaningful to the farmers by expressing them 
as a choice between unirrigated land as the risky prospect and irrigated 
land as the sure prospect. For landless laborers the certain income was 
a steady job and the uncertain income the daily labor market. We soon dis­
covered that, when expressing the prospects in this way, the choices often 
did not reflect attitudes towards risk but also other preferences: culti­
vating irrigated land is much more time consuming and many farmers pre­
ferred unirrigated land because it gives them more leisure. In such cases 
the interviewers pointed out that the income streams from both kinds of 
land were net of labor cost and asked the farmer to abstract from their 
leisure preferences. If the interviewer felt that the respondent was un­
able to abstract from other preferences, he presented the same questions 
but in the form of different income streams such as animal husbandry versus 
crop enterprises or trading versus fixed employment. I see no other way 
of getting around the problem of confounding, except to go back to pure 
betting questions; but farmers do not.·understand why pure betting ques­
tions are asked in the first place. 
The method was pretested at the same time as the investigators were 
trained. All investigators have a master's degree in agricultural economics 
and--with one exception--had worked in their villages collecting data 
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for more than one year. It is unlikely that one could find better quali­
fied and trained investigators. During this entire phase all of us involved 
had the feeling that most respondents were taking the questions seriously 
and making an effort at providing a reasonable answer. Otherwise we would 
not have continued. The first suspicion of unreliability arose when the 
results from one village showed that one investigator could not have under­
stood the method properly. The answers he obtained depended on whether he 
started to approach the certainty equivalent from below or above. The next 
suspicion arose when the data for the two neighboring villages Shirapur and 
Kalman were analyzed. They are shown in Table A-1. The certainty equi­
valents were converted into partial risk-aversion coefficients using a 
constant risk aversion function approximation and grouped into the same 
classes as those of the experimental study, except that the intermediate 
and moderate classes were pooled. (The interval of partial risk aversion 
coefficients covered by these two classes were so small relative to the 
variability in interview answers that the frequency of observations in each 
class was small.) 
The second 
First) compare the results in the two neighboring villages of the first 
survey which was done by two different investigators, A and B. Shirapur 
shows much more risk aversion than Kalman although both villages are very 
similar. The difference between the distributions of attitudes is statis­
tically significant. 
We then reinterviewed all households in four of the six villages. 
In the villages of Akola district, each investigator interviewed half of 
the respondents in his own village and half of the respondents in his 
Table A-1 
Reliability of Survey Results in Shirapur and Kalman 
I. Risk AversioTI, Distributions Obtained by Different Investigators in Two Villages• 
Risk Aversion Class 
Village Intermed. Slight 
and Survey or or or Number of 
Survey Investigator RE,survey Extreme Severe Moderate Neutral Negative Observations 
Shirapur 
(second) A RE,survey 10 9 4 5 5 33 
Shirapur B Survey 20 10 3 33 
(first) 
Kalman 
(first)• A Survey 4 5 5 11 4 29 
Kalman 
B RE,survey 11 12 1 2 3 29(second) 
II. Anal1.sis of Switches in Classification 
On ReE1urve1. as compared to Survey Number Percent of s.!!!!!P_le size 
Remained in same class 21\ 62.9
Switched into neighboring class 18} 
ChangE,d by two classes on risk 
aversion side 10 16.1 
ChangE,d from extreme risk a"·ersion 
to slight or neutral 
ChangE,s from risk averse side to 21.0 
negative risk aversion :}
(excluding shift from slight or 
neutral to negative) 
Shirapur first ve1. Kalman first Chi Square• 27.71 
Shirapur first VEI. Shirapur second Chi Square• 15,91 X 2 
,.., 
,D4,0.05 • 9.49 
Kalman first vs. Kalman second Chi Square• 13.53 
*In ab~olute numbers 
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neighboring village. In those villages not much systematic difference be­
tween investigators or between rounds could be observed, although the two 
answers of many individual respondents were quite different. In Shirapur 
and Kalman each investigator reinterviewed the households of the other vil­
lage and the results are given in the first and fourth line of Table 3. 
It is clear that in each village investigator B classifies respondents as 
much more risk-averse than investigator A. The differences between in­
vestigators are statistically significant. The shift to more pronounced 
risk aversion must be an investigator bias and cannot be caused by the time 
lag of more than a month between interviews, since the time sequence of in­
terviewers was reversed in each village. Clearly the interview technique 
is subject to severe investigator bias, despite the fact that both inter­
views tried not to influence the respondents. 
Panel II shows the stability of the answers from individual respon­
dents between the two rounds and thus accounts for offsetting shifts of 
two respondents between classes of risk aversion. 62.9% of. individuals 
remained in the same class or shifted into a neighboring class. Particu­
larly disturbing is the fact that between interviews more than 20% of 
individuals are radically reclassified, either between extreme risk 
aversion and neutrality or between positive and negative risk aversion. 
A similar analysis of shifts has been performed in Table A-2 for 
the experimental game. Note that, at the high payoff levels, radical re­
classifications must be very rare because the extreme and the neutral:-to­
negative risk aversion groups contain only very small proportions of the 
population. The classifications for the shifts in the game results are 
Table A-2 
Analy_si_s_ of _Frequency_of Shifts Among Classes of Risk Aversion in the Game* 
Those who chose 
OnlI efficientlI Inefficientli No. of 
Games Shift Shift Shift Shift Shift Both Obser-
Involved Unchanged by 1 by 2 by 3 by 4 by 5 Once Times vations 
1 and 2 
0.50 Rs 15.7 37.4 14.S 5.5 1.3 1.3 23.0 1.3 235 
4 and 5 
o.so Rs 32.2 33.5 12.7 2.5 1.3 .9 15.3 1.7 236 
7 and 9 
5 Rs 39.6 26.8 15.3 1.3 0.4 1.7 14.9 1.7 235 
12 and 17a 
50 Rs. 62.7 19.5 5.1 11.0 1.7 118 
aGrune No. 17 is hypothetical 




also somewhat finer because the intermediate and moderate groups are treated 
as separate categories. If preferences were very stable, people should re­
main in the same class or, at most, shift by one class if they previously 
were indifferent between two games. Between the first and the second 0.50-
Rs-game only 53.10% of individuals remain stable in this sense, the other 
shifting by two or more classes or choosing inefficient alternatives at 
least once. This level of instability is roughly comparable with the inter­
view results in Table A-1. However, as payoffs increase, answers become 
more stable. At the 50 Rs. level over 60% of individuals do not change 
their choice and an additional 19.5% switch only to a neighboring alternative 
which is consistent with indifference. Note that game 17 is only hypothetical 
and it is possible that choices would have been more or less stable if the 
game had really been played. Of course, at the 50 Rs level, switching is 
severly constrained by the fact that very few individuals are observed in 
the extreme and neutral-to-negative classes of risk aversion so that the 
observed stability is likely to be reliable. 
At the lower game levels, much of the increased stability could be 
caused by learning. The answers f4uw ~d.JJJ.~~ 4 and 5 are not less stable 
than from games 7 and 9, despite the higher game level of the latter two. 
Table A-3 compares our own interview results with the game results and 
the interview results of Dillon and Scandizzo. The intermediate and moderate 
class of risk aversion have again been combined. Dillon and Scandizzo 
give explicit data on the slight-to-neutral and negative classes of risk 
aversion, but not on the "extreme" classification. I chose to put only those 
individuals into the extreme class who opted for the highest possible cer­
tainty equivalent in their study. In comparing interview results with 
Table A-3 



































c. Game No. 2; 0.50 Rs 1.7 5.9 48.7 15.1 1 8.5 10.1 118 
D. Game No. 12; SO Rs 2.5 5.1 74.6 6.8 1.7 9.3 118 
E. Game No. 16; 500 Rs 2.5 8.2 85.9 0 0.9 2.5 118 





















(A) vs (C) CHI-SQUARE= 96.87 x24,0.05 m 9.49. All other chi-square values for interview versus games 
exceed the above value of 96.87 
*In percent of number of observat:l.ons 
aSubsistence-at-risk and subsistence-assured refer to two different payoff levels. In the f.irst, the "bad" 
outcome would result in the farmer not being able to meet his subsistence income while in the second case 
the bad year outcome would exceed that level. 
b Computed from tables 2, 3 and 4 by combining the data for sharecroppers and small farmers. The 103 res-
pondents do not include 15 respondents who were not willing to answer the questions or whose answers were 
-~ ...,internally inconsistent, as judged by the interviewers. Similarly the 222 farmers in my own interview 
studies excludes roughly 10 respondents on similar grounds. 
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game result,, also note that in the game the favorable and unfavorable pros­
pects had 50% probabilities each, while for the interview methods these pro­
babilities were 75% and 25% respectively, i.e., the distribution of outcomes 
was skewed. 
The interview results of Dillon and Scandizzo are similar to my own. 1 
A large proportion of individuals seem to be extremely risk-averse (18.2% 
to 32%) which is in sharp contrast to all the experimental results. ·Also 
all interviews find a sizable proportion of risk preferers of between 13.6% 
and 27.2%. Such a high proportion of risk preferers is found only in the 
0.50 Rs game but at higher payoffs the fraction is insignificant. Note 
that in the interviews the payoffs were roughly equal to or exceeded the 
2payoffs of the 500-Rs.-game. 
The interview results also identify more individuals in the severe 
risk aversion class than the game. In my own interview results the severe 
and extreme risk aversion classes combined contain 61% of the population 
(at both levels of payoff) while in the 500 Rs game these classes contain 
only 11.7% of the respondents. All the differences between the interview 
and the game results in India are statistically significant. 
Of a total of 118 farmers available for interview, Dillon and Scan­
dizzo excluded 15 because they either did not want to answer or because 
their answers were internally inconsistent. In the game all those present 
1The only qualitative difference is that the proportion of individuals 
with negative risk aversion is roughly constant in my study while it increases 
substantially in the study by Scandizzo and Dillon. 
2Kennedy (1976) used an interview technique based on focus loss with 
Australian farmers. Of 27 farmers who gave consistent answers, eight or 29% 
were found to prefer risk and one was risk neutral. Unfortunately, I can­
not compute the number or extreme risk averters from his results. Also, note 
that Kennedy disregarded the results of nine farmers (out of 36) because of 
inconsistencies in their answers. 
4.'.> 
want to play, but even there inconsistencies with "rational" behavior can 
arise, such as choosing risk-inefficient alternatives. 
The question arises why the interview results so radically mis­
measure the real extent of risk aversion. There seems to be a tendency 
for interview results to particularly exaggerate the extent of severe 
and extreme risk aversion. But it cannot only be such a systematic bias 
because the interviews also exaggerate the extent of risk neutrality and 
preference. Furthermore, the only reason for the misleading results does 
not seem to be the absence of real payoffs because the 0.50 Rs game shows 
more individuals to be risk-neutral or preferring than the interview, but 
fails to show as many severe or extreme risk averters. The mismeasurement 
must also result f~om the fact that--in an interview-a respondent usually 
has less than one-half hour to reflect and understand the complicated 
question of how much expected return he is willing to give up for a re­
duction in risk. In the game reflection times are much longer and no in­
terviewer is present who would be pleased if the respondent gave his answer 
quickly--a fact which the respondent also knows. Agricultural production 
decisions, and :many other real life decisions, are taken with much longer 
lead times than one-half hour from the time that they are first considered. 
We therefore must conclude that evidence on risk aversion from pure inter­
views is unreliable, nonreplicable and misleading, even if one is interested 
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